The ceasefire is holding. The Strait is still closed. Four strategies for prying it open and what each costs.

Iran closed the Strait on February 28, cutting 10 million barrels per day from global markets—the largest oil disruption in history. A ceasefire began April 7, but the Strait stayed closed. Iran formalized a $2 million per-ship toll into law; Russia and China vetoed UN action. Four strategies now compete.

1. Send the Navy (Michael Eisenstadt, Washington Institute; IISS; Hudson Institute)

The US cleared the Strait once before. It can do it again—but this time, Iran has 5,000 mines and the navy is already stretched thin.

Operation Earnest Will worked—127 escort missions, zero tankers sunk. From 1987-88, the US Navy protected 270 vessels through the Strait. Special operations (Prime Chance) interdicted Iranian mining from barges in the northern Gulf.

Modern mine-sweep combines sonars, drones, warship escorts, air strikes, and special ops. Michael Eisenstadt at the Washington Institute adds pressure on Iran's own exports via Kharg Island, which handles 90% of Iranian crude.

But mine-clearing in wartime is "near impossible," UK Defence Secretary John Healey notes. Even success restores only a fraction of normal traffic. A backlog of 800+ vessels would take months to clear. The navy may lack assets for both escort and offensive strikes without abandoning other theaters.

Forty countries want the Strait open. The question is whether a coalition without America—and without enforcement power—can make Iran comply.

UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper convened 40 countries April 2—UK, France, Germany, Japan, India, South Korea, UAE, Australia. They pledged to "ensure safe passage." Military planners are coordinating mine-clearing, escort protocols, and intelligence-sharing.

The notable absence is the US. Trump said Hormuz security is "not America's job." CFR scholars and legal experts propose a binding treaty modeled on the Montreux Convention (which regulates the Bosporus), with Iran and Oman as riparian states and binding closure prohibitions.

International law sides with the coalition. UNCLOS Articles 37–44 forbid impeding transit passage. The ICJ's 1949 Corfu Channel ruling rejected coastal state veto rights. But Russia and China vetoed UN action April 7, leaving law unenforceable.

3. Squeeze Them Back (Washington Institute, Hudson Institute, Sanctions Advocates)

Iran's toll system is projected to generate tens of billions a year. The counter-move: threaten the 90% of Iranian crude that flows through one island.

Iran's toll could yield nearly $100 billion annually at pre-war traffic. Iran formalized the tolls into law April 4–6; Oman, the EU, US, Japan, and South Korea rejected them.

Blockading Kharg Island—which handles 90% of Iranian crude—is the sharpest counter. It forces Iran to choose between reopening Hormuz or facing economic collapse. Hudson Institute and Washington Institute strategists back this approach.

Targeted sanctions on oil, petrochemicals, and banking are slower but require less escalation. The constraint: China will circumvent them through alternative payment systems without US-EU-Japan coordination.

4. Let Pakistan and China Broker It (Pakistan, China, Regional Mediators)

Pakistan brokered the ceasefire. China co-authored the framework. The gamble: can the countries Iran actually listens to deliver what the US military cannot?

Pakistan brokered the ceasefire. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif offered Islamabad as a venue March 23. Pakistan and China proposed a five-point framework March 31. Pakistan clinched the deal April 7–8, with Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE supporting.

Trump demands "complete, immediate, safe opening" without tolls. Iran agreed to "cease defensive operations" and allow passage for two weeks, but only with "coordination with Iranian armed forces" and "due consideration of technical limitations." The gap between Trump's "without limitation" and Iran's "technical limitations" is where the deal breaks.

The ceasefire is fragile. Iran cited Israeli attacks on Hezbollah as violations April 8 and threatened to re-close the Strait. 800+ vessels remain trapped. The question: can Pakistan and China convert a two-week pause into a permanent opening?

Where This Lands

The military option has worked before, but Iran's capabilities now dwarf 1988, and even best-case restores only a fraction of normal traffic. The coalition has law and 40 countries but no enforcement and no US. The Kharg blockade is the sharpest lever but escalates rather than ends the conflict. And the ceasefire hasn't moved a single ship. Whether this lands in negotiation or military escalation depends on whether the two-week pause holds long enough for one strategy to work—or collapses into the default.

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