A month into the US-Israel war on Iran, Yemen's Houthi rebels opened fire on Israel on March 28 — their first direct strikes since the conflict began. Both missiles were intercepted. A Houthi official told CNN that closing the Bab al-Mandab Strait is a viable option. Trump brokered a US-Houthi ceasefire in May 2025, but it explicitly excluded Israel.

1. This Is Bad For The US (Military Hawks, Middle East Institute, LSE)

If both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab go dark, the energy artery connecting the Gulf to Europe is severed end-to-end.

This is the scenario nobody wanted. Iran already closed the Strait of Hormuz on March 2, choking off 20% of global seaborne oil. Now the Houthis threaten the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which handles another 6-7 million barrels daily. The Pentagon dispatched 2,500 Marines on March 28 — the same day as the strikes — but those resources now split between two fronts. It cost the US upwards of $1 billion a month to fight the Houthis in 2024, and Washington still couldn't stop them.

Every new front tilts the war of attrition toward Iran. Nadwa Al-Dawsari of the Middle East Institute assessed that the Houthis could shift the balance in a long war — every missile Israel intercepts depletes air defense supplies, every drone the US diverts resources to destroy strains an already stretched military. Fawaz Gerges of the London School of Economics calls this all-out regional conflict. During the Gaza war, the Houthis attacked over 100 merchant vessels and disrupted about $1 trillion in annual trade. Now they're doing it again with stronger motivation.

The ceasefire was designed to fail. The May 2025 deal explicitly carved out Israel — Houthis reserved the right to keep attacking Israeli targets. Hawks warned at the time that this concession would come back to haunt Washington. It did, in exactly the way they predicted.

2. They Were Always Going to Join (Proxy War Realists)

The Houthis are part of Iran's "axis of resistance" — their entry was inevitable, predictable, and frankly overdue by a month.

This is textbook Iranian forward defense. Iran's strategy has always been to confront threats beyond its borders through proxy forces. The Quds Force provides training, weaponry, and funds to groups like the Houthis precisely for moments like this. The connection dates back to the 1980s and deepened after 2010 when Houthis began confronting Saudi Arabia directly.

The Houthis have been signaling for a month. On February 28, the day the US-Israel strikes on Iran began, the Houthis immediately threatened to escalate. Senior politburo member Mohammed al-Bukhaiti said the group was considering a naval blockade targeting vessels of "aggressor countries." Saree vowed strikes would continue "until the aggression against all fronts of the resistance ceases." Nobody who watches Yemen was surprised by March 28.

What's notable is the delay, not the entry. The Stimson Center notes that Houthis had to weigh the benefits of joining against the risk of Israeli precision strikes — the kind that decapitated IRGC leadership and Hezbollah. They waited a month, watched the war develop, and chose their moment. That's strategic calculation, not impulsive solidarity.

3. This Is Our Right (Houthi Supporters and the Resistance Axis)

The Houthis frame their intervention as self-defense of the resistance axis and explicitly note their ceasefire with the US never covered Israel.

The ceasefire was never violated. The May 2025 deal, brokered by Oman, applied exclusively to US-Houthi maritime conflict in the Red Sea. The Houthis emphasized at the time that the agreement did not cover Israel "in any way, shape, or form." Attacking Israeli military sites is entirely consistent with the terms they signed.

We Have To Help Iran. Al Jazeera reported that ordinary Yemenis fear the economic consequences of being dragged into the US-Iran conflict. Yemen is already in a humanitarian crisis from its own civil war. But the Houthi government frames this as solidarity with Iran — the same logic that drove over 100 ship attacks during the Gaza war.

The Houthis are now more capable than ever. They've moved from importing Iranian weapons to assembling drones locally using commercially available parts. Their arsenal includes Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 long-range drones, plus Barq-1 and Barq-2 surface-to-air missile systems unveiled in 2023. The IISS notes they can develop and produce weapons domestically, though they still rely on Iranian components.

4. They Just Painted a Target on Themselves (Deterrence Optimists, Soufan Center, Chatham House)

There's a reason the Houthis waited a full month. They know what happened to Hezbollah's leadership — and they have more to lose now than they did in 2024.

The month-long delay tells you everything about their confidence level. The Soufan Center reported that the Houthis were deterred from joining earlier by fears that the US or Israel would destroy Hodeidah, their most important port. Resupply from Tehran has become difficult. The US sent warnings through Omani mediators. They didn't join out of strength — they joined because the pressure to show solidarity finally outweighed the fear of getting hit.

Israel already killed their prime minister. Ahmed al-Rahawi and several cabinet members were killed in Israeli precision strikes. The Houthis of 2026 run ministries, control ports, operate a tax system and a university network, and negotiate with Riyadh through Muscat. They have infrastructure now — and infrastructure is targetable. Every visible military operation generates the signatures that enable precision strikes.

Their missiles don't work very well. UN data shows 38 of 101 Houthi ballistic missiles failed outright between September 2024 and July 2025 — a 38% failure rate. The supply chain is degrading: seekers, guidance electronics, and engines all require imports, and interdiction is tightening. A former US diplomat told Al Jazeera the March 28 strikes amounted to "token participation, not full participation." Chatham House's assessment is blunt: if strikes stay focused on Israel, they won't change the war.

Where This Lands

The Houthis waited a month, watched Israel decapitate Hezbollah's leadership and the IRGC's command structure, and still decided to join. That's either conviction or miscalculation. Their missiles are interceptable, their failure rate is 38%, and their most important port is one Israeli strike away from rubble. But both chokepoints are now in play, and if Bab al-Mandab goes dark alongside Hormuz, the energy artery connecting the Gulf to Europe is severed entirely.

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