The US launched strikes on Iran on February 28 without consulting NATO allies. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte praised the results but said NATO was "not involved" and would not be "dragged into" the conflict. Spain refused base access and closed its airspace. Germany said "this is not our war." Trump called them cowards and a "paper tiger." When he demanded allies send ships to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, every major NATO member refused.
1. They Should Have Shown Up (Trump, US Hawks)
NATO allies watched America fight a war that benefited all of them — and wouldn't even send a frigate.
Trump's frustration has a real foundation. Iran's nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and regional proxies threatened every NATO member's energy supply and security interests. NATO allies reaped the benefits of Iran's nuclear capability being destroyed while refusing to share any of the risk. The calculus looks especially bad given that the US runs the Iran war from European bases — Ramstein refuels aircraft, Fairford hosts B-52 bombers, and France and Germany host tanker operations.
The refusal exposed NATO as a one-way street. Trump called the alliance a "paper tiger" and said allies had gone out of their way not to help. Rutte himself applauded the strikes and said Khamenei's death was welcomed by many NATO colleagues. If they agreed with the outcome, the argument goes, they should have been willing to help achieve it.
2. This Was Not NATO's War (Spain, Germany, France, CFR)
The US started a war without asking. Article 5 doesn't cover the Persian Gulf. Refusing to participate isn't disloyalty — it's how the alliance is supposed to work.
NATO is a defensive alliance, and the US was on offense. Article 5's geographic limits exclude the Persian Gulf entirely — the treaty covers member territories in Europe, North America, and the North Atlantic. The US attacked Iran without consulting allies, without NATO authorization, and without seeking collective agreement. Spain's defense minister called the campaign "illegal, reckless and unjust." Germany's Boris Pistorius was blunt: this is not our war, we have not started it.
Even when Iran fired at a NATO member, Article 5 didn't apply. Iran launched a ballistic missile at Turkey in early March. NATO intercepted it. Rutte still said nobody was talking about Article 5. The alliance condemned Iran and defended Turkey but did not escalate — because the treaty's geographic and defensive logic held. Analysts at the Council on Foreign Relations and Defense Priorities argued the refusal reflected adherence to the alliance's foundational defensive logic, not weakness.
3. Help — But Not Too Much (UK Government, CFR Analysts)
Europe's bases are critical to US operations. That gives Europe leverage to shape the war's goals, not just follow Trump's orders.
The UK threaded the needle. Starmer allowed US bombers to use RAF Fairford for defensive operations and later broadened access for Strait of Hormuz-related strikes — but signaled in April that he would not permit attacks on Iranian energy infrastructure or civilian targets. That's a genuine contribution with clear limits: help reopen the shipping lane, don't help flatten Iran's economy.
CFR analysts argue Europe has more leverage than it realizes. The US runs the Iran war from European bases. Without Ramstein, Fairford, and Mediterranean logistics hubs, American power projection collapses. That infrastructure gives Europe a seat at the table — and CFR proposed a targeted role: help clear mines and monitor the Strait of Hormuz, maintaining burden-sharing without getting pulled into the broader conflict. The argument is that Europe should contribute on its own terms, not as a subordinate following Trump's demands.
Where This Lands
The factual picture is genuinely complicated. Trump is right that NATO allies benefited from Iran's nuclear program being destroyed while refusing to share the risk — and his fury at being told no is understandable. On the other hand, Europe is right that the US launched a war without consulting anyone, that Article 5 was never designed for the Persian Gulf, and that being called a coward for declining to join someone else's fight is not a persuasive recruitment strategy. The UK's approach — help on specific terms, refuse the rest — may be the most realistic model. Where this lands depends on whether you think NATO is an alliance of equals who get consulted before wars start, or a coalition of the willing that should show up when the shooting starts.