The U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a Section 123 nuclear cooperation agreement on July 22 and a companion safeguards accord. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman were the signatories. Unlike the 2009 U.S.-UAE "gold standard" deal — which prohibited enrichment, prohibited reprocessing, and required deeper IAEA inspections — this deal includes none of those restrictions. The deal includes a two-year joint study on domestic uranium enrichment. If the U.S. rejects enrichment at the end of that study, Saudi Arabia can't pursue it elsewhere for a decade. The IAEA's Additional Protocol for deeper monitoring isn't required. Congress has 90 days to review and can reject the deal. The day after signing, Trump posted on Truth Social: "There will be no enrichment of material!" Two U.S. officials told ABC News the deal "leaves open the possibility that Saudi Arabia will enrich uranium domestically in the future."

1. The Administration (Chris Wright, Marco Rubio)

U.S. officials say the deal upholds nonproliferation standards and keeps American companies in the game.

U.S. companies get Saudi Arabia's nuclear contracts — not Russia or China. Energy Secretary Wright said the agreements "uphold the highest standards of nuclear safety and nonproliferation" using "the world's best nuclear technology." The pitch is simple: American firms win multi-billion-dollar contracts, and the U.S. shapes how Saudi Arabia enters the nuclear age instead of watching from the sideline.

Rubio says proliferation risk is off the table. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the U.S. "is not going to reach any agreement with any country in the world that leads to the risk of proliferation." The 10-year hold provision works as a safety valve: if the joint enrichment study ends in a U.S. rejection, Saudi Arabia can't go elsewhere for a decade.

2. Nonproliferation Critics (Sen. Ed Markey, Rep. Brad Sherman, Jon Wolfsthal, Kelsey Davenport)

Critics say the deal skips the safeguards that make the Iran policy coherent — and gives a nuclear-ambitious state exactly what it's been asking for.

MBS already said he'd go nuclear if Iran does. MBS has publicly stated that Saudi Arabia would "follow suit" if Iran developed a nuclear weapon. In 2019, Saudi Energy Minister Abdulaziz said the kingdom aims "for the full cycle, from producing uranium, to enriching uranium, using the uranium." Saudi Arabia ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1988 — but so had several countries before they pursued weapons programs.

The deal is missing the two safeguards that matter most. No ban on enrichment or reprocessing. No IAEA Additional Protocol for deeper monitoring. Jon Wolfsthal, a former Biden administration official now at PAX Sapiens, said he's "extremely skeptical" that Saudi enrichment will stay peaceful, citing MBS's stated intentions and Saudi Arabia's ties to Pakistan's nuclear program. Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association called this a "terrible" precedent. Matthew Kroenig at the Atlantic Council put it plainly: enrichment and reprocessing are "dual-use technologies" — civilian and weapons.

Sen. Markey says the deal is "irresponsible and dangerous." Sen. Ed Markey, co-chair of the bicameral Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group, called it a recipe for disaster: allowing Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear weapons "would be irresponsible and dangerous." Rep. Brad Sherman drew the Iran line directly: "We have no idea who is going to be running Saudi Arabia 10 years from now." The U.S. is bombing Iran right now for enriching uranium, Sherman noted, while the deal gives Saudi Arabia the green light to study the same thing.

3. Pro-Engagement Analysts — But With Warnings (Jennifer Gordon, Daniel Shapiro, Atlantic Council)

Some analysts support U.S. involvement to shape Saudi Arabia's nuclear program — but say the deal gave away negotiating leverage it didn't need to.

If the U.S. doesn't do this deal, Russia or China will. Jennifer T. Gordon, who leads nuclear energy policy at the Atlantic Council, called the agreement a "victory for the US-led global nonproliferation regime." Her argument: U.S. involvement in Saudi nuclear development means U.S. influence over its direction. Saudi Arabia was going to pursue nuclear capacity regardless; Gordon argues American companies bring American standards with them.

But the administration signed without using this as leverage. Daniel Shapiro, an Atlantic Council fellow focused on Middle East security, noted the deal was "de-linked from Saudi normalization with Israel" — the U.S. gave away a major strategic asset without extracting a major strategic concession first. Trump tried to walk that back in his Truth Social post, adding the Abraham Accords as a condition after the deal was already signed. Former State Department undersecretary Bonnie Jenkins put it more directly: "It is not clear that there is a strategy for the region."

Where This Lands

Energy Secretary Wright says the deal keeps U.S. companies competitive and keeps nuclear standards in American hands rather than Russian or Chinese ones. Critics in Congress and the nonproliferation world say the deal is missing the two things that would make it credible — a ban on enrichment and real IAEA oversight — and that the U.S. is making this concession while bombing Iran for the same capability. Analysts who support U.S. engagement grant the point. But they say the administration traded away leverage without securing Israeli normalization or stronger safeguards. Congress has 90 days to vote on it.

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