Iran has roughly 441 kg of uranium enriched to 60% — enough fuel for nine nuclear weapons, needing only 1% more enrichment work to reach weapons-grade 90%. Most of it is buried in underground tunnels at Isfahan. Trump's 15-point peace plan demands Iran dismantle all three sites, halt enrichment, and transfer every gram to the IAEA. Iran rejected the plan as "excessive, unrealistic and unreasonable." So the question is: what should the US do now?

1. Take It — By Force If Necessary (Hawks, Lindsey Graham, Trump)

You can't bomb the uranium away. Eventually someone has to go in and get it. The only question is whether you do it now or after Iran finishes the bomb.

Trump hasn't ruled it out. He told reporters "Maybe we will...Maybe we will do it later" when asked about sending ground troops to seize the material. Secretary of State Marco Rubio advised pressing Tehran to surrender the uranium as a ceasefire condition, with military seizure as a fallback if demands aren't met. The Pentagon is considering an additional 10,000 ground troops to widen Trump's options, with quick-reaction Marine units and 82nd Airborne paratroopers already staging in the region.

The logic is simple: 441 kg of near-weapons-grade uranium can't stay in Iran. At 60% enrichment, a single cascade of IR-6 centrifuges could produce weapons-grade material for one bomb every 25 days. Using Fordow's 16 cascades, the timeline drops to nine days. Every day the stockpile sits in Iran is a day closer to a weapon. The June strikes destroyed the centrifuges, not the fuel. Leaving the fuel means leaving the problem.

The IAEA can't verify anything. As of February 2026, the Agency has zero access to any of Iran's four enrichment facilities. Tehran suspended all cooperation after the June strikes. The IAEA can't confirm the size, composition, or location of the stockpile. Grossi knows Isfahan held over 200 kg of 60% uranium at the last inspection, but he can't get in to see what's there now. Arms control that relies on trust and access has neither.

2. Please, please don't do it. (Arms Control Experts, Former Military Commanders)

Seizing 441 kg of enriched uranium from buried tunnels in an active war zone would be the largest special operations mission in history. It can't be done quickly, safely, or cheaply.

It wouldn't be a raid — it'd be a war. Joseph Votel, former commander of CENTCOM and Special Operations Command, said flatly: "This is not a quick in-and-out operation". Former NATO commander James Stavridis called it potentially "the largest special operations forces in history". Over 1,000 troops would need to be on-site, with heavy excavation equipment to dig through sealed tunnels, sweeping for mines and booby traps, while holding perimeters under fire from the mainland. Isfahan is several hundred miles from the nearest U.S. ships.

Nobody even knows where all the uranium is. A U.S. official laid out the core problem: "The first question is, where is it? The second question is, how do we get to it and how do we get physical control?". Iran moved uranium from Fordow to Isfahan before the June 2025 strikes. The IAEA can't confirm current locations. Iran is building a new underground facility — "Pickaxe Mountain" — tunneled into the Zagros range near Natanz. You can't seize what you can't find.

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists summed it up: "There are no good options." Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association said that if the goal is securing Iran's nuclear materials, IAEA monitoring plus downblending is the safest path — if political conditions allow. A military seizure would draw Iranian retaliation, extend the war past four to six weeks, and require a sustained ground presence in one of the most fortified regions on earth.

3. Iran Will Fight to the Death (Iran, Historical Precedent, Realists)

Gaddafi surrendered his nuclear program. NATO killed him seven years later. Iran learned the lesson.

Libya is the precedent. In December 2003, Gaddafi renounced Libya's weapons programs and welcomed international inspectors. In March 2004, a cargo ship with 500 tons of centrifuges and nuclear equipment left for the United States. The U.S. hailed it as a "model for other countries" and hoped Iran, North Korea, and Syria would follow. In 2011, NATO overthrew and killed Gaddafi. North Korean officials now cite his fate to justify keeping their own bombs.

Iran's enrichment program is existential, not transactional. Iran rejected Trump's 15-point plan and called the demands "excessive, unrealistic and unreasonable". Iran's counter-demands include ending all attacks, guarantees against future conflict, compensation for war damages, and recognition of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. Enrichment, Iran insists, is non-negotiable. These aren't opening positions in a negotiation. They're the terms of a country that watched what happened to the last leader who gave up his nuclear program.

And even if Iran agreed to Trump's terms, we'd still be in the dark. The IAEA doesn't know whether Iran has enriched more uranium in the nine months since inspectors lost access. Iran could have hidden material at undisclosed sites, or enriched further at "Pickaxe Mountain". Any deal that requires Iran to surrender "all" uranium depends on knowing what "all" means — and right now, nobody does.

Where This Lands

Trump wants the uranium out of Iran. The question is whether that happens through a ceasefire deal Iran has already rejected, a military operation that former generals call the largest special forces mission in history, or a diplomatic framework that relies on an IAEA that currently has zero access. Where this lands depends on whether Trump decides the risk of going in is worse than the risk of leaving it there.

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